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The Judgment in the first phase of Case 002 at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was received with fanfare and considerable 
hyperbole on 7 August 2014. At a press conference to mark the verdict, David 
Scheffer, UN Secretary-General’s Special Expert on UN Assistance to the 
Khmer Rouge Trials, announced that: “Today, the winds of international 
justice swept though the fields, forests, and towns of Cambodia where millions 
perished.” 
After a conflict that killed a quarter of the population of Cambodia and caused 
incalculable damage to its society, two defendants, Khieu Samphan and Nuon 
Chea, were found guilty of crimes against humanity relating to the forced 
transfer of millions of civilians and the extermination of deposed Khmer 
Republic officials during the Khmer Rouge’s evacuation of Phnom Penh and 
other urban areas in 1975. It has taken the ECCC more than 8 years and more 
than $200m to get to this point (and the case is not over yet – the recent 
verdict is only for a limited number of charges. Case 002 was split to enable 
efficient handling, with the second part of the trial just started). The first 
phase of the trial lasted 222 days, included testimony from 92 individuals and 
166,500 pages of written evidence, and was attended by over 100,000 people. 
So, was it worth it? As a follow-up to my previous critique of the ECCC, this 
post assesses initial responses to the verdicts in Case 2. 
The responses I focus on below are from, for the most part, Western 
politicians, lawyers and NGOs. This is not to suggest that responses from 
Cambodians are unimportant – just that my focus here is on the way the 
Cambodian case plays into or disrupts the dominant discourse on 
international justice propagated by predominantly Western commentators. 
This discourse, as demonstrated by Leslie Vinjamuri, has moved from a focus 
on justice as intrinsically valuable towards claims that justice is 
instrumentally valuable because of the goods it can deliver. The outcomes or 
consequences of justice that are most frequently asserted are deterrence and 
peace, on the one hand, and democracy and rule of law, on the other. Much 
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work has been done recently to provide evidence for these outcomes. For 
instance, Katherine Sikkink claims that prosecutions for human rights abuses 
deter future human rights violations, and Olsen, Payne and Reiter claim that 
transitional justice mechanisms have a positive effect on human rights and 
democracy measures. 
Reactions to Case 002 at the ECCC are of particular interest because of 
the paucity of democracy and respect for human rights in contemporary 
Cambodia. Claims that justice has had instrumental value there would be very 
hard to substantiate. So what do its supporters claim? Early analysis shows 
that, in the absence of strong claims to make about the instrumental value of 
justice, proponents revert to making claims about its intrinsic value. Critics of 
the Court also focus on the intrinsic qualities of justice (criticising the court 
for delivering a poor quality of justice or too little justice) but do not engage 
with questions of whether justice has brought positive consequences for 
democracy, the rule of law and so on. 
As would be predicted by Vinjamuri, supporters of the ECCC made some, 
though rather weak, claims about the instrumental value of justice soon after 
the Case 002 verdict. For instance, Stephen Rapp (US Ambassador for War 
Crimes) said the verdict would deter future crimes by sending a message to 
future generations that ‘[a]nyone in a position of committing such crimes will 
know that “Their day of judgment will arrive. There is no escaping it in this 
life.”’ ECCC National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang stated 
that the ECCC process had been ‘good for Cambodia, the rule of law and 
democracy’ and Kip Hale (formerly of the Office of the Prosecutor at the 
ECCC) argued that ‘[m]any thousands of Cambodians personally witnessed a 
functioning court of law conducting transparent and fair trials while 
delivering justice’ and that ‘[t]hrough day-to-day interactions between 
Cambodians and internationals, the ECCC has trained many Cambodian 
lawyers, court administrators, and other professionals who will work in 
various Cambodian public and private sectors once the ECCC closes.’ 
However, the contemporary situation in Cambodia refutes claims that the 
ECCC has had a positive impact on democracy and the rule of law. The HRW 
World Report 2014 lists multiple HR violations on behalf of the ruling CPP 
government or its allies, including excessive use of force by the police in 
response to protests about the fraudulent national elections; widespread land-
grabs by economically and politically powerful actors; violence from security 
forces towards people peacefully protesting these land-grabs; political 
imprisonment; arbitrary detentions; and frequent and large-scale abuses by 
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the security forces which are allowed to go unpunished. In a sign of its 
concern, the UN HR Council has extended the mandate for the Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights in Cambodia until Sept 2015. 
Equally, there is no evidence that the ECCC has had positive effects even in 
the more narrow field of the Cambodian justice sector. The US State 
Department’s report on human rights in Cambodia in 2013 found that: ‘A 
weak judiciary that sometimes failed to provide due process or a fair trial 
procedure remained a leading human rights concern as large portions of 
society were unable to receive fair adjudications of their legal concerns … The 
government prosecuted some officials who committed abuses, but impunity 
for corruption and most abuses by government forces persisted.’ 
In the absence of evidence of that the ECCC has instrumental value in 
Cambodia, rather than reassess their prior views of the value of the Court, 
supporters assert the intrinsic qualities of justice. Rapp, for 
instance, praised the verdict for recognising the death and suffering that 
victims and survivors had endured and argued that the ECCC had given 
Cambodians a lesson in their recent history. Chea Leang noted the 
participation of the Civil Parties and the attendance of the public (a position 
which assumes participation in justice is a good in itself) and 
Hale asserted that the verdict ‘has immense symbolic value’ both because it 
managed to place ‘formerly untouchable leaders in the dock’ and also because 
the grudging apologies or expressions of regret by defendants were ‘important 
cathartic moments for a still-healing nation’. The International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) commended the role the ECCC played in giving ‘an 
opportunity for victims and civil society to contribute to shaping a shared 
narrative of the past’ and Craig Etcheson (formerly an investigator in the OTP 
at the ECCC) emphasized the ‘extraordinary cache of documents and 
testimonies’ amassed during the investigation and trial processes. 
In short, supporters of the Court focused predominantly on the intrinsic value 
of justice, rather than its consequences. What about criticisms of the Court in 
the aftermath of the verdict? These, too, were directed at the quality or 
quantity of justice rather than its results. Human Rights Watch stated that ‘[t] 
he convictions of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan are too little and too late to 
save the Khmer Rouge tribunal from being regarded as a failure … The goal of 
justice for Khmer Rouge victims has been irrevocably tarnished by Prime 
Minister Hun Sen’s political interference, long delays, and pervasive 
corruption.’ Amnesty International expressed similar views: “the … refusal of 
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senior Cambodian government officials to give evidence, as well as allegations 
of political interference in other ECCC cases, is troubling and raises concerns 
around the fairness of the proceedings and respect for victims’ right to hear 
the full truth regarding the alleged crimes.’ 
Criticism was also directed at the quantity of justice: Human Rights 
Watch stated that ‘[t]he trial barely scratched the surface of the crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge … It is a sad indictment of the Khmer Rouge 
tribunal that … Cambodians now face the prospect that only three people will 
be held legally accountable for the destruction of their country.’ The 
ICTJ concurred: ‘for various reasons the ECCC trials have taken a very long 
time to prosecute very few people … The ECCC trials cover a four year period 
but this is only part of a longer conflict that also saw the significant 
involvement of the USA and China in different phases’. The Economist noted 
that ‘it is hard to avoid the feeling that the drive for justice in Cambodia is 
ending with an unsatisfying whimper. Foreign pressure for a more searching 
process has failed to overcome the resistance of the Cambodian government.’ 
These criticisms are based on the assumed intrinsic value of justice – they 
imply that if justice in Cambodia had been of a higher quality or more 
encompassing, then better results would have been achieved. The only other 
criticisms I have come across in response to the verdict concern the choice of 
retributive justice versus reparative justice and justice versus development. 
The ICTJ calls for additional justice mechanisms: ‘creative and substantial 
measures to acknowledge the truth of what happened and to memorialize it in 
a way that assists in ensuring non-recurrence’ along with ‘meaningful and 
comprehensive reparations’. Sichan Siv (a former US Ambassador to the UN), 
on the other hand, would favour less rather than more or different justice, on 
the basis that the money spent on the ECCC would have been better spent on 
development: ‘For a country as poor as Cambodia … how many teachers you 
could train with that money, how many nurses you can provide and how many 
hospitals and schools you can build? And to spend that much money, to bring 
these people to injustice, in a way, it’s a waste of resources.’ 
What is striking here is that no one has taken supporters of the ECCC to task 
on the question of whether justice leads to improvements in democracy and 
human rights observance, as leading TJ scholars claim. Of the commentators 
mentioned above, only The Economist (not the most dedicated champion of 
human rights) mentions the current human rights record and the threats to 
democracy in Cambodia. In some senses this might be welcome realism – 
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critics may be limiting their critiques to what they believe the ECCC is actually 
capable of. But by failing to engage on the consequences of justice in 
Cambodia, they miss the opportunity to highlight current conditions there. 
The lack of attention paid by both supporters and critics of the ECCC to 
contemporary conditions in Cambodia matters not just because the 
Cambodian case challenges received wisdom in the transitional justice field. It 
is also likely to have material effects. Cambodians who wanted prosecutions of 
the Khmer Rouge often did so because they hoped a court would help to focus 
international attention on Cambodia (the situation in the country was long-
ignored as Cambodia was used as a pawn in Cold War politics). They were 
right – the ECCC has brought international attention – but it has not brought 
non-corrupt governance, human rights, the rule of law, a reliable justice 
system or any of the other things that Cambodians have routinely been 
denied. Allowing proponents of justice to imply, in the face of the evidence, 
that the ECCC has brought instrumental benefits, or to switch their claims to 
the intrinsic value of justice, risks facilitating a discourse of ‘success’ in 
Cambodia that ignores the many problems that remain, and allowing 
international attention to divert to the next crisis on the assumption that the 
job in Cambodia has been done. 
 
